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INTRODUCTION
We live in a period of extraordinary technological change. A
series of overlapping and converging emergent technologies are
disrupting every industry in our economy and every aspect of our lives.
These emerging technologies include synthetic biology, gene editing,
nanotechnology, artificial intelligence, internet of things, 3D
printing, drones, applied neurotechnologies, and blockchain
and cryptocurrencies.
Each of these emerging technologies promises immense benefits,
which explains why they will move forward into our economy and lives
at a frantic pace. But such technologies also present concerns, including
risks relating to safety, health, the environment, privacy, “playing
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God,”1 national security, bias and discrimination, fairness, economic
equality, and democratic values. These risks need to be adequately
addressed and managed if the associated technology is to be
successfully adopted and integrated into society.
Yet, governance of emerging technologies presents an
intractable challenge. Existing regulatory agencies lack the legal
authority, expertise, and resources to regulate any of the emerging
technologies comprehensively, even if they wanted to. But such
sweeping traditional regulation may be inadvisable given how fast the
technologies are progressing, which would likely make any regulatory
enactments obsolete before their ink dried. The complexity of
applications, entities, issues, and stakeholders further complicates
regulation. Other governance approaches, including precaution,
liability, and resilience, may also have a role to play, but each is
incomplete and imperfect in its own right.
Governance of emerging technologies therefore presents a
conundrum. No single optimum solution exists, but rather a collection
of second-best strategies intersect, coexist, and—in some ways—
compete. This situation seems unsatisfactory until it is observed
through the lens of the “wicked problem” framework.2 The wicked
problem concept recognizes there is often no single, optimal solution to
such a problem, but rather a mix of substandard solutions that must
“satisfice.”3 That is the best that can be done with a wicked problem.
This also may be the best solution for the governance-of-emergingtechnologies problem.
This Article discusses the advantages of using the wicked
problem framework to rethink the governance-of-emergingtechnologies problem. Using this framework forces the recognition that
there will not be a single, effective solution to this problem. The defining
1.
“Playing God” refers to the concern that humans are engaging in dangerous hubris when
they try to change fundamental elements of the natural world as created by a supernatural creator.
PRESIDENTIAL COMM’N FOR THE STUDY OF BIOETHICAL ISSUES, NEW DIRECTIONS: THE ETHICS OF
SYNTHETIC BIOLOGY AND EMERGING TECHNOLOGIES 136, 156 (2010), https://bioethicsarchive.
georgetown.edu/pcsbi/sites/default/files/PCSBI-Synthetic-Biology-Report-12.16.10_0.pdf [https://
perma.cc/3DS2-7PVX]. Ironically, the argument is made more by secular than religious technology
critics. Id. at 156. The Presidential Commission for the Study of Bioethical Issues found such
terminology to be “unhelpful at best, misleading at worst.” Id.
2.
The first definition of “wicked problems” is believed to have been offered in an editorial
by Professor C. West Churchman in 1967, who cited a definition by his University of California
colleague Professor Horst Rittel of this new concept of wicked problems as “that class of social
system problems which are ill-formulated, where the information is confusing, where there are
many clients and decision makers with conflicting values, and where the ramifications in the whole
system are thoroughly confusing.” C. West Churchman, Wicked Problems, 14 MGMT. SCI. B-141,
B-141 (1967).
3.
Herbert A. Simon, Theories of Decision-Making in Economics and Behavioral Science, 49
AM. ECON. REV. 253, 262–64 (1959).
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characteristics of a wicked problem—complexity, diversity, and
uncertainty4—make a perfect or even satisfactory solution to emerging
technologies governance beyond reach. Rather, the best strategy will be
to integrate a number of imperfect tools, recognizing and trying to
compensate for their particular flaws, in pursuit of moving forward with
highly beneficial technologies, while exercising responsibility and care
to the extent feasible.
Part I expands the argument that emerging technologies are
difficult to govern, and these management challenges align with the
definition of a wicked problem. Part II surveys the various approaches
that have been advocated for governing emerging technologies,
describing not only their advantages but also their flaws and
limitations. Finally, Part III elaborates on how the wicked problem
concept provides a viable framework for moving forward with a
governance system that is imperfect but suffices to achieve an
acceptable outcome.
I. THE WICKED PROBLEM OF EMERGING TECHNOLOGY GOVERNANCE
Emerging technologies—such as synthetic biology, gene editing,
nanotechnology, artificial intelligence, internet of things, 3D printing,
drones,
applied
neurotechnologies,
and
blockchain
and
cryptocurrencies—present a common set of governance challenges.5
Perhaps most significant is the “pacing problem,” where the pace of
technology development far outstrips the capability of regulatory
systems to keep up.6 Powered by growing market demand and intense
business competition, new technologies are being developed, deployed,
and commercialized faster than ever before.7 At the same time,
traditional governmental processes of legislation, regulation, and
judicial review have been slowed by increasing bureaucratic
requirements and the increasing politicization of technological
disputes.8 The result of accelerating technology and decelerating
regulatory oversight is a growing governance gap. Any new statutes or
4.
Brian W. Head & John Alford, Wicked Problems: Implications for Public Policy and
Management, 47 ADMIN. & SOC’Y 711, 716–18 (2015).
5.
Gary E. Marchant, Conclusion: Emerging Governance for Emergent Technologies, in
INNOVATIVE GOVERNANCE MODELS FOR EMERGING TECHNOLOGIES 254, 254 (Gary E. Marchant,
Kenneth W. Abbott & Braden Allenby eds., 2013).
6.
Gary E. Marchant, The Growing Gap Between Emerging Technologies and the Law, in
THE GROWING GAP BETWEEN EMERGING TECHNOLOGIES AND LEGAL-ETHICAL OVERSIGHT: THE
PACING PROBLEM 19, 19 (Gary Marchant, Braden Allenby & Joseph Herkert eds., 2011).
7.
See id. at 20–22 (giving examples of this phenomenon in areas such as computing power,
biological technology, and internet infrastructure).
8.
Id. at 22–28.
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regulations affecting these new technologies are likely to be outdated
before the ink dries. As technology governance expert David Rajeski has
noted, “[i]f you think that any existing regulatory framework can keep
pace with this rate of change, think again.”9 Facing such a bleak
prospect, regulators often sensibly defer regulation, waiting for a more
stable technology plateau that may or may not ever come.
A second regulatory challenge of many emerging technologies is
that they present risks and concerns outside the scope of existing
regulatory agency jurisdictions.10 Regulatory agencies, such as the U.S.
Food and Drug Administration, are restricted to regulating the safety
and efficacy of products. But many applications of emerging
technologies raise broader ethical and social concerns relating to human
enhancement, “playing God,” autonomy, dignity, fairness, equitable
access, privacy, and longer-term impacts on society.11 These issues are
largely outside the safety and efficacy scope of current agency
jurisdictions and thus often escape any regulatory oversight.
Yet another challenge to the regulation of emerging technologies
is their breadth of application. Technologies such as artificial
intelligence, nanotechnology, and blockchain span the entire industry
spectrum, as well as many nonindustrial activities and sectors. They
are sometimes referred to as “enabling” or “platform” technologies that,
like computers or the internet, have the potential to affect virtually
every industry sector.12 There are thousands, if not tens or hundreds of
thousands, of ways these core technologies are used, each with their
own context of risks and benefits. These broad applications not only
involve many different types of industries and businesses, but also
affect many other types of stakeholders and nongovernmental
organizations with particular interests in specific applications. The
broad applications of these technologies also span many different
regulatory agencies, each with their own organic statutes with different
requirements, criteria, and goals. The end result of this multitude of
applications, regulated parties, stakeholders, and regulators is
tremendous regulatory diversity and complexity. Further complicating
the regulatory challenge, emerging technologies are inherently

9.
David Rejeski, The Next Small Thing, 21 ENV’T F. 42, 45 (2004).
10. Gary Marchant, Ann Meyer & Megan Scanlon, Integrating Social and Ethical Concerns
into Regulatory Decision-Making for Emerging Technologies, 11 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 345
(2010).
11. See Marchant, supra note 5, at 255.
12. Robert Falkner & Nico Jaspers, Regulating Nanotechnologies: Risk, Uncertainty and the
Global Governance Gap, 12 GLOB. ENV’T POL. 30, 35 (2012).
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international in application, creating the need for some type of
international coordination.13
Finally, the unprecedented uncertainty about emerging
technologies also impedes effective regulation.14 Because the
technologies are so new and moving forward so quickly, there is
enormous uncertainty about the trajectories, benefits, and risks of these
technologies.15 Given these uncertainties, it is possible to paint
unrealistically optimistic or pessimistic visions of the technology at
issue, thus fostering public controversy, conflict, and unease.16
In summary, the governance of emerging technologies is
characterized by complexity, diversity, and uncertainty. These same
characteristics—complexity, diversity, and uncertainty—are the
defining characteristics of a wicked problem.17 As a wicked problem, the
governance of emerging technologies is unlikely to be solved by a single
or simple solution. Traditional government regulation will not be
sufficient, or many times even appropriate, for emerging technologies.18
Rather than traditional regulation—consisting of enforceable rules
unilaterally imposed by a regulatory agency—emerging technologies
will require a “governance” approach that expands the categories of
responsible parties beyond government to include the private sector,
nongovernmental organizations, and think tanks and also expands the
relevant oversight mechanism beyond enforceable government
regulations.19 Four alternative governance approaches for emerging
technologies are discussed and evaluated in the next Part.

13. Marchant, supra note 5, at 255–56.
14. Id. at 254–55.
15. Falkner & Jaspers, supra note 12, at 33 (“Scientific uncertainty is particularly
pronounced in emerging technologies, such as biotechnologies, nanotechnologies or
synthetic biology.”).
16. Id. (“[G]lobal risk governance for emerging technologies tend to be politicized where
scientific uncertainty is high.”).
17. Head & Alford, supra note 4, at 716–18.
18. Marchant, supra note 5, at 256 (“[T]raditional government regulation alone cannot
adequately govern most emerging technologies.”); Wendell Wallach & Gary Marchant, Toward the
Agile and Comprehensive International Governance of AI and Robotics, 107 PROC. IEEE 505, 506
(2019) (“[T]here is a growing consensus that traditional government regulation is not sufficient for
the oversight of emerging technologies . . . .”).
19. See O. Renn & M.C. Roco, Nanotechnology and the Need for Risk Governance, 8 J.
NANOPARTICLE RSCH. 153, 157–58 (2006); see also Orly Lobel, The Renew Deal: The Fall of
Regulation and the Rise of Governance in Contemporary Legal Thought, 89 MINN. L. REV. 342
(2004) (arguing for a more reflexive governance approach incorporating nongovernment actors in
a variety of regulatory areas).
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II. ALTERNATIVE STRATEGIES FOR GOVERNING
EMERGING TECHNOLOGIES
The governance of emerging technologies is unsettled. There are
many competing approaches and strategies but no consensus for how to
govern these technologies, except that traditional modes of regulation
will not work.20 There are four major alternative approaches to
governing emerging technologies, and they can be categorized along two
dimensions: ex ante versus ex post and permissive versus prohibitive.
These four different approaches are typically presented as contrasting,
mutually exclusive choices—policymakers must choose one or the other
(a premise revisited later in this Article). The four alternatives are
shown below in Table 1 and then briefly summarized in the
following subsections.
TABLE 1: FOUR MAJOR ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES
TO EMERGING TECHNOLOGY GOVERNANCE
Permissive

Prohibitive

Ex ante

Soft Law

Precaution

Ex post

Resilience

Liability

A. Soft Law
The ex ante, permissive category of governance approaches
involves soft law instruments. Soft law instruments set forth
substantive requirements that are not directly enforceable by
government regulators.21 They can consist of private standards, codes
of conduct, certification programs, principles, guidelines, and voluntary
programs.22 Soft law programs have a number of benefits for governing
emerging technologies, including that they are more agile than
traditional regulation because they can often be adopted or revised

20. See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
21. Gary E. Marchant & Brad Allenby, Soft Law: New Tools for Governing Emerging
Technologies, 73 BULL. ATOMIC SCIENTISTS 108, 112 (2017).
22. Ryan Hagemann, Jennifer Huddleston Skees & Adam Thierer, Soft Law for Hard
Problems: The Governance of Emerging Technologies in an Uncertain Future, 17 COLO. TECH. L.J.
37, 44–45 (2018); Kenneth W. Abbott, Gary E. Marchant & Elizabeth A. Corley, Soft Law Oversight
Mechanisms for Nanotechnology, 52 JURIMETRICS 279, 286–96 (2012); Diana M. Bowman &
Graeme A. Hodge, Counting On Codes: An Examination of Transnational Codes as a Regulatory
Governance Mechanism for Nanotechnologies, 3 REGUL. & GOVERNANCE 145, 146–47 (2009).
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relatively quickly.23 The voluntary nature of these programs also makes
them more cooperative than adversarial, which can sometimes
contribute toward success.24 Other advantages of soft law instruments
are that they can address any issues ranging from health risks to
ethical concerns, multiple approaches can be tried simultaneously by
different stakeholders, and they can be gradually “hardened” into more
formal regulatory oversight with experience. Because soft law is not
tied to specific regulatory agencies, this approach is not bound to
specific legal jurisdictions and is inherently international
in application.25
Soft law approaches also have their disadvantages, however.
Their biggest limitation is that—without any potential penalties for
noncompliance—their voluntary nature means that some entities will
choose not to comply with a soft law instrument, and some of those that
do assert their intent to comply may not do so in good faith.26 Soft law
instruments are also sometimes too vague and general to have any real
impact or meaning, allowing companies that support such instruments
to be self-serving and engage in “greenwashing.”27 A related weakness
is that unlike government regulation, where anyone who wants to
comment during its enactment can do so, there is no guaranteed right
of participation in the development of soft law instruments, and they
are often crafted by a small group of self-selected parties.28 Finally, a
secondary benefit of regulation is to reassure the public that a problem
is being addressed, but polls show that the public lacks confidence in

23. Wallach & Marchant, supra note 18, at 506.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. See Steffen Foss Hansen & Joel A. Tickner, The Challenges of Adopting Voluntary Health,
Safety and Environment Measures for Manufactured Nanomaterials: Lessons from the Past for
More Effective Adoption in the Future, 4 NANOTECHNOLOGY L. & BUS. 341, 353–55 (2007) (noting
lack of incentives for companies to participate in voluntary programs).
27. “Greenwashing” refers to the practice of a company engaging in a public relations ruse,
such as signing on to a voluntary environmental program, without fundamentally changing the
internal practices and external impacts of that entity. See Dorit Kerret & Alon Tal, Greenwash or
Green Gain? Predicting the Success and Evaluating the Effectiveness of Environmental Voluntary
Agreements, 14 PA. STATE ENV’T L. REV. 31, 35 (2005). Recently, the similar term “ethics washing”
has been coined for the alleged practice of some companies to adopt ethical principles for emerging
technologies, such as artificial intelligence, that are cosmetic only and have no practical effect on
the company’s ethical performance. See Elettra Bietti, From Ethics Washing to Ethics Bashing: A
View on Tech Ethics from Within Moral Philosophy 1 (Proc. of the 2020 Conf. on Fairness,
Accountability & Transparency, Jan. 2020), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_
id=3513182 [https://perma.cc/3ENP-TETN].
28. Hansen & Tickner, supra note 26, at 355 (critiquing lack of transparency and open
participation in voluntary programs).
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many soft law programs.29 Of course, there are actions that entities
supporting soft law solutions can take to enhance the effectiveness and
public confidence in soft law instruments, such as involving credible
nongovernmental organizations in the development and oversight of
the instrument or implementing third-party certification and auditing
measures. However, without a concerted effort to buttress the
effectiveness and credibility of soft law programs, they will often
have neither.
B. Precaution
Precaution, most often implemented in the form of the
precautionary principle, seeks to “err on the side of caution” to prevent
adverse effects from a human activity, such as the production or use of
an emerging technology.30 It is therefore an example of an ex ante
prohibitive governance approach. The European Union is the
recognized leader in applying the precautionary principle, having
adopted the principle as a binding legal requirement in its foundational
legislation.31 Even though the United States has not adopted the
precautionary principle per se, it does exercise precaution in many of
its regulatory programs.32 For example, risk assessments by U.S.
regulatory agencies often use “conservative” assumptions that apply a
plausible worst-case estimate of risk.33 The precautionary principle has
been adopted based on a historical pattern of regulators failing to take
sufficient protective action against uncertain risks that eventually
turned out to impose large safety risks on the population.34 The
29. JANE MACOUBRIE, WOODROW WILSON INT’L CTR. FOR SCHOLARS, INFORMED PUBLIC
PERCEPTION OF NANOTECHNOLOGIES AND TRUST IN GOVERNMENT 14 (2005) (“The majority of study
participants felt that voluntary standards applied by industry would not be sufficient.”).
30. See Wingspread Conference on the Precautionary Principle, SCI. & ENV’T HEALTH
NETWORK: BLOG (Aug. 5, 2013), http://sehn.org/wingspread-conference-on-the-precautionaryprinciple [https://perma.cc/4S99-Z54J] (“When an activity raises threats of harm . . . precautionary
measures should be taken even if some cause and effect relationships are not fully established
scientifically.”); PROTECTING PUBLIC HEALTH & THE ENVIRONMENT: IMPLEMENTING THE
PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE 59 (Carolyn Raffensperger & Joel Tickner eds., 1999)
(“[E]xperience . . . tells us that we should not be so overcautious in applying the Precautionary
Principle. Nine times out of ten we will not err on the side of caution, but later realize that
precaution was necessary.”).
31. Treaty Establishing the European Community art. 130r, Feb. 7, 1992, 1992 O.J. (C 224)
1, 52, reprinted in 31 I.L.M. 247, 285 (1992); see also Communication from the Commission on the
Precautionary Principle, at 7, COM (2000) 1 final (Feb. 2, 2000).
32. Jonathan B. Wiener & Michael D. Rogers, Comparing Precaution in the United States
and Europe, 5 J. RISK RSCH. 317, 318 (2002).
33. See Frank B. Cross, Paradoxical Perils of the Precautionary Principle, 53 WASH. & LEE L.
REV. 851, 857–59 (1996) (using the Environmental Protection Agency’s process as an example).
34. EUR. ENV’T AGENCY, LATE LESSONS FROM EARLY WARNINGS: THE PRECAUTIONARY
PRINCIPLE 1896-2000, at 11 (Poul Harremoës, David Gee, Malcolm MacGarvin, Andy Stirling, Jane
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precautionary principle flips the presumption on uncertainty—now
uncertainty is used to block a technology until the uncertainties can be
resolved in favor of safety, rather than being used as a barrier to taking
regulatory action.35
The precautionary principle has been used to delay a number of
emerging technologies, including biotechnology and nanotechnology,
especially in Europe. The precautionary principle has a number of
limitations, however, that have impeded its adoption in the United
States.36 First, there is no agreed-upon definition or meaning of the
precautionary principle, even among its advocates, and, accordingly,
jurisdictions that adopt the precautionary principle fail to define it.37
There is disagreement, for example, over whether the precautionary
principle applies to only serious and irreversible risks or to a much
broader range of risks.38 There are no clear criteria on how much
uncertainty triggers the principle or how much data the proponent of a
technology must produce to satisfy the principle.39 A related problem is
that the precautionary principle is applied selectively, and on an ad hoc
basis, to appease certain groups’ opposition to a particular technology.40
At the same time, other technologies that are at least as dangerous are
exempted from the precautionary principle because the principle is
applied arbitrarily and subjectively rather than through application of
objective criteria and scientific knowledge.41 The precautionary
principle is often justified as helping to reassure the public that a
technology is safe and can be trusted, but there are studies showing
Keys, Brian Wynne & Sofia Guedes Vaz eds., 2001), https://www.eea.europa.eu/publications/
environmental_issue_report_2001_22/Issue_Report_No_22.pdf/view
[https://perma.cc/P58TCP72].
35. Carl F. Cranor, Learning from the Law to Address Uncertainty in the Precautionary
Principle, 7 SCI. & ENG’G ETHICS 313, 316 (2001).
36. Gary E. Marchant, From General Policy to Legal Rule: Aspirations and Limitations of the
Precautionary Principle, 111 ENV’T HEALTH PERSPS. 1799, 1800–03 (2003).
37. Per Sandin, Dimensions of the Precautionary Principle, 5 HUM. & ECOLOGICAL RISK
ASSESSMENT 889, 889–90 (1999).
38. Marchant, supra note 36, at 1800 (“Different versions of the [precautionary principle]
vary, for example, in the level of the threat necessary to trigger the principle from ‘threats of
serious or irreversible damage’ to ‘possible risks,’ a discrepancy of enormous policy importance.”).
39. Id. at 1800–01.
40. Id. at 1801 (“In the absence of such criteria, the application of the [precautionary
principle] appears to be governed primarily by arbitrary decisions based on individual and group
self-interests and biases.”).
41. See Jonathan B. Wiener, Precaution, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 597, 600–01, 611–12 (Daniel Bodansky, Jutta Brunée & Ellen Hey eds.,
2007) (comparing precaution in Europe and the United States to illustrate “precautionary
particularity,” which is “the selective use of precaution by different states against different risks”);
Marchant, supra note 36, at 1801 (“The ambiguity of the [precautionary principle] invites arbitrary
application, both with respect to which risks it is applied to and what it requires when it
does apply.”).
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that implementation of the precautionary principle to a technology
increases rather than decreases public anxiety.42 Finally, the
precautionary principle does not consider the health benefits of a
technology—for example, some technologies such as nanotechnology
may have the potential to save many lives, and thus banning such
technologies under the precautionary principle would do more harm
than good.43 As Cass Sunstein has noted, the precautionary principle,
applied fairly, is paralyzing because it would ban what it
simultaneously mandates.44
C. Resilience
The approaches discussed so far are ex ante, where a governing
body must anticipate and predict risks before they occur. Given the
enormous uncertainties about emerging technologies, ex ante
approaches can create the concern that potential risks that never
manifest will receive too much focus, while the real risks that
unexpectedly develop will be overlooked. Ex post approaches like
resilience do not have that problem, as they respond to risks after they
result in harm. Resilience is the more permissive form of ex post
governance—it does not seek to punish the risk creator but rather to
mitigate the harm that results from an action or technology.45
Resilience involves measures that seek to restore the fundamental
structure and functions of a system after harm occurs.
The U.S. National Academies of Sciences defines resilience as
“the ability to prepare and plan for, absorb, recover from, and more
successfully adapt to actual or potential adverse events.”46 Given that
some harm is likely from any human activity or technology, resilience
is a prudent and necessary strategy to try to minimize those resulting
harms. Resilience can be substantive—such as requirements for
42. Peter M. Wiedemann & Holger Schütz, The Precautionary Principle and Risk Perception:
Experimental Studies in the EMF Area, 113 ENV’T HEALTH PERSPS. 402, 404 (2005); Peter M.
Wiedemann, Andrea T. Thalmann, Markus A. Grutsch & Holger Schütz, The Impacts of
Precautionary Measures and the Disclosure of Scientific Uncertainty on EMF Risk Perception and
Trust, 9 J. RISK RSCH. 361, 368–70 (2006).
43. See Cass R. Sunstein, Beyond the Precautionary Principle, 151 U. PA. L. REV. 1003, 1020–
24 (2003) (extrapolating this concept to areas like genetically modified foods and drug testing).
44. Cass R. Sunstein, Throwing Precaution to the Wind: Why the ‘Safe’ Choice Can Be
Dangerous, BOS. GLOBE (July 13, 2008), http://archive.boston.com/bostonglobe/ideas/
articles/2008/07/13/throwing_precaution_to_the_wind/?page=full [https://perma.cc/92ZV-BGHE].
45. Gary E. Marchant & Yvonne A. Stevens, Resilience: A New Tool in the Risk Governance
Toolbox for Emerging Technologies, 51 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 233, 244–48 (2017).
46. COMM. ON INCREASING NAT’L RESILIENCE TO HAZARDS & DISASTERS & COMM. ON SCI.
ENG’G, & PUB. POL’Y, THE NAT’L ACADS. SCIS., ENG’G, & MED., DISASTER RESILIENCE: A NATIONAL
IMPERATIVE 16 (2012).
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insurance, remediation funds that can pay for cleanup, or “kill switches”
that can deactivate a runaway genetically modified organism or AI
system.47 Resilience can also be procedural—putting in place systems
for adaptive management or emergency response for prompt mitigation
of harms.48 Just as secondary prevention may be more feasible than
primary prevention for some health problems,49 resilience after harms
occur may be a more effective and feasible strategy for some risks than
ex ante risk assessment and risk management, which may unduly delay
or block beneficial technologies.50
Nonetheless, resilience does have its limitations. Resilience
addresses risks that are either inevitable and unpreventable, or
incapable of being predicted ex ante. If the risk was not predicted, one
cannot be certain that the resilience measures in place will effectively
ameliorate the unanticipated hazards.51 Another limitation of resilience
approaches is that they wait until the harm occurs before trying to
reduce the impacts, rather than preventing the risk in the first place.
Many examples, from asbestos52 to the Dalkon Shield53 to global
warming,54 demonstrate that it would be much preferred and effective
to have prevented the problem in the first place, rather than to try to
mitigate the harm after it occurs. Finally, resilience is a relatively new

47. Marchant & Stevens, supra note 45, at 254, 262–70.
48. Id. at 255–62.
49. See id. at 250 (explaining that medicine relies on secondary prevention measures, such
as screenings and medication, because it is impossible to prevent all illnesses and injuries).
50. Resilience is therefore consistent with the concept of permissionless innovation. See ADAM
THIERER, PERMISSIONLESS INNOVATION: THE CONTINUING CASE FOR COMPREHENSIVE
TECHNOLOGICAL FREEDOM 1–3 (2014) (defining permissionless innovation as “the general freedom
to experiment and learn through ongoing trial-and-error experimentation”).
51. Even though resilience applies after harm occurs, the success of the resilience measures
will depend on the advance preparations for the resilience to apply. David D. Woods, Four Concepts
for Resilience and the Implications for the Future of Resilience Engineering, 141 RELIABILITY ENG’G
& SYS. SAFETY 5, 8–9 (2015).
52. Asbestos was introduced as a “miracle” fiber that could provide effective and inexpensive
insulation in buildings and other applications, but it ended up killing hundreds of thousands of
workers with painful mesothelioma and other lung cancers. EUR. ENV’T AGENCY, supra note 34,
at 52.
53. The Dalkon Shield was a contraceptive device that injured tens of thousands of women
and caused birth defects to many of their progeny because the device did not work as advertised.
Joseph A. Page, Asbestos and the Dalkon Shield: Corporate America on Trial, 85 MICH. L. REV.
1324, 1324 n.1, 1326 (1987).
54. The adverse impacts of global warming from the accumulation of greenhouse gases, such
as carbon dioxide, in the atmosphere are, for practical purposes, irreversible, as the resulting
changes in the climate will take many centuries or even thousands of years to reverse given the
long residency time of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere. See EDMOND A. MATHEZ, CLIMATE
CHANGE: THE SCIENCE OF GLOBAL WARMING AND OUR ENERGY FUTURE 128 (2009) (noting that
once “large quantities of CO2 [are injected] into the atmosphere,” it may take “tens of thousands
of years for the climate system to recover to its former state”).
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strategy for governing emerging technologies, so it is the least
developed and validated approach.55
D. Liability
The fourth competing strategy for governing emerging
technologies is liability, which is ex post and prohibitive, but can
provide a powerful risk management or governance effect.56 If an
emerging technology harms people, the entities responsible for
unleashing that technology could be held liable for the resultant
injuries. Liability can be more effective than regulation in managing
some risks, such as tobacco, because it requires corporate defendants to
divulge information, has fewer barriers to action, and is less susceptible
to political pressure.57 Liability not only can compensate people for their
injuries, but can also be a powerful deterrent against unreasonable
risks and incentivize companies to ensure that technologies and
products are developed and used safely.58 Another advantage of liability
as a governance tool is that, because it is ex post, it does not need to rely
on speculation about hypothetical risks, as it only kicks in once real
harm has occurred.59 Finally, litigation relies on citizens in their roles
as jurors to determine liability and damages in litigation, thus
providing for democratic representation by the public in decisions
about technologies.
Not surprisingly, litigation also has its disadvantages as a
technology governance approach. To start, financial compensation
cannot truly make up for some injuries, especially irreversible harms
55. Jeryang Park, Thomas P. Seager & P. Suresh C. Rao, Lessons in Risk- Versus ResilienceBased Design and Management, 7 INTEGRATED ENV’T ASSESSMENT & MGMT. 396, 398 (2011)
(“[T]he development of practical methods to implement resilience in an engineering context is still
in an incipient stage.”).
56. See, e.g., Jonathan H. Adler, Free & Green: A New Approach to Environmental Protection,
24 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 653, 667–71 (2001) (detailing the effects of environmental liability on
land management); Keith N. Hylton, When Should We Prefer Tort Law to Environmental
Regulation?, 41WASHBURN L.J. 515, 520–28 (2002) (comparing tort litigation liability to a form of
private enforcement); Alexandra B. Klass, Common Law and Federalism in the Age of the
Regulatory State, 92 IOWA L. REV. 545, 582–84 (2007) (advocating for using the common law regime
as a means of environmental protection).
57. Patrick Luff, Regulating Tobacco Through Litigation, 47 ARIZ. STATE L.J. 125,
163–73 (2015).
58. While deterrence is a frequently cited purpose of tort liability, the empirical evidence on
whether liability actually deters actors is mostly inconclusive. Benjamin van Rooij & Megan
Brownlee, Does Tort Deter? Inconclusive Empirical Evidence About the Effect of Liability in
Preventing Harmful Behavior, in CAMBRIDGE HANDBOOK ON COMPLIANCE (forthcoming 2021),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3563452 [https://perma.cc/HV55-EZTJ].
59. See James A. Henderson, Jr., Tort vs. Technology: Accommodating Disruptive Innovation,
47 ARIZ. STATE L.J. 1145, 1147–48 (2015) (articulating how the American tort system’s lack of ex
ante regulation encourages innovation).

8–Marchant_PAGE.docx (Do Not Delete)

2020]

12/12/20 11:32 AM

GOVERNING EMERGING TECHNOLOGIES

1873

such as human deaths or permanent damage to the environment.60
Second, many emerging technologies have highly uncertain effects and
consequences, making it difficult to recognize and prove that an
emerging technology caused a specific injury to a given plaintiff, which,
in turn, allows some technology products or applications to escape
liability.61 Third, litigation is an expensive process, with very high
administration costs to pay for lawyers, expert witnesses, and court
expenses. Fourth, liability is particularly ineffective against long-tail
risks, where the long lag between the time of the tortious act and the
resulting damages (and litigation) dilutes the deterrent effect.62 Many
emerging technologies such as nanotechnology, synthetic biology, and
artificial intelligence may have long-term hazards that would create
such long-tail risks. Fifth, defendants are increasingly using mandatory
arbitration and liability waivers to reduce the impacts, and hence the
deterrent effect, of liability.63 Finally, while a benefit of litigation is that
it empowers citizens as jurors to decide culpability and penalties, the
flip side is that lay jurors can produce irrational, inconsistent,
or excessive judgments that distort risk management and
impede innovation.64
E. Summary of the Four Alternative Governance Approaches
Given that traditional regulation is inadequate and poorly
aligned to govern emerging technologies, four alternative approaches
have been proposed: soft law, precaution, resilience, and liability. Each
of these approaches has its advantages and strengths, but each, on their
own, also has serious limitations. To date, there is competition and
conflict over which of the four approaches should be adopted. The critics
of each approach tend to have the upper hand, with the proponents on
the defensive because each of these approaches is seriously flawed if
relied on as the sole mechanism for governance. As discussed in the
final section of this paper, however, the wicked problem framework may

60. See Marchant & Stevens, supra note 45, at 243.
61. Id. at 242–43.
62. Michael G. Faure, The Complementary Roles of Liability, Regulation and Insurance in
Safety Management: Theory and Practice, 17 J. RISK RSCH. 689, 696 (2014).
63. Ryan Martins, Shannon Price & John Fabian Witt, Contract’s Revenge: The Waiver
Society and the Death of Tort, 41 CARDOZO L. REV. 1265, 1267–68, 1299–1300 (2020).
64. Daniel Kahneman, David Schkade & Cass R. Sunstein, Shared Outrage and Erratic
Awards: The Psychology of Punitive Damages, 16 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 49, 72–73 (1998); Reid
Hastie & W. Kip Viscusi, What Juries Can’t Do Well: The Jury’s Performance as a Risk Manager,
40 ARIZ. L. REV. 901, 912 (1998).
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provide a more holistic and satisfying approach to break the existing
deadlock on how to govern emerging technologies.
III. FRAMING EMERGING TECHNOLOGY GOVERNANCE
AS A WICKED PROBLEM
The wicked problem concept provides a different, and perhaps
more revealing and useful, framework for understanding the emerging
technology governance challenge. The wicked problem literature
provides several pertinent lessons for breaking through the emerging
technology governance logjam. The first lesson is that there is no perfect
solution, as each solution is a “clumsy solution.”65 The four alternative
strategies proposed for governing emerging technologies are certainly
“clumsy” solutions—they each have their own major imperfections. But
given that governance of emerging technologies is a wicked problem, we
can expect nothing more, and just because a solution is clumsy and
imperfect is not a reason to reject it entirely. Rather, the way forward
is to determine how to use each or any of the alternative strategies to
advance governance and make progress in addressing concerns
associated with an emerging technology, notwithstanding the
imperfections of the chosen approach. In other words, the goal must be
muddling through, not optimizing the response.66 This accords with a
second lesson from the wicked problem literature: we should not expect
perfection, only partial success.67
The path forward may be guided by a third lesson from the
wicked problems literature: a combination of strategies is needed to
address the problem.68 In other words, rather than thinking of the four
alternative governance strategies as conflicting and inapposite,
perhaps they can work together to compensate for each of their
limitations. The four approaches could be integrated into a governing
toolbox for emerging technologies, with a custom mix of the strategies
being deployed for each emerging technology governance problem based
on the context and circumstances of each concern.

65. Thomas Hartmann, Wicked Problems and Clumsy Solutions: Planning as Expectation
Management, 11 PLAN. THEORY 242, 242 (2012).
66. Charles E. Lindblom, The Science of “Muddling Through,” 19 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 79, 80
(1959) (describing a problem-solving methodology in which the problem solver “muddles through”
policy options).
67. Duco Bannink & Willem Trommel, Intelligent Modes of Imperfect Governance, 38 POL’Y
& SOC’Y 198, 214 (2019) (“A wicked problem in itself does not allow perfect, but instead only
imperfect responses.”).
68. Catrien J.A.M. Termeer, Art Dewulf, Gerard Breeman & Sabrina J. Stiller, Governance
Capabilities for Dealing Wisely with Wicked Problems, 47 ADMIN. & SOC’Y 680, 699–703 (2015).
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For example, consider the use of the emerging technology of gene
drives to eliminate a species of mosquito that transmits a dangerous
disease such as malaria or zika virus. A gene drive is a genetic system
that can be inserted into the genome of a species in nature. The gene
drive is preferentially passed on in reproduction, so it can quickly
spread throughout and even eliminate an entire population.69 While
this technology could potentially save thousands or even millions of
human lives that might otherwise be lost to the pathogen carried by the
target mosquito species, the intentional forced extinction and
displacement of an existing species in an ecosystem could have all kinds
of detrimental but unforeseen consequences.70 Given the potentially
serious and irreversible consequences of gene drives, this is an
emerging technology application that calls for precaution.71
Thus, it is appropriate to apply precaution as a first governance
strategy by postponing deployment of the gene drive until adequate
safety demonstrations and modeling have been completed and
appropriate consultations with stakeholders have taken place.72 A
second strategy, resilience, could be employed to engineer “kill
switches” into any released gene drives, which would allow the gene
drive to be deactivated if things started to go wrong.73 A third strategy,
soft law, could provide private, multinational standards or guidelines—
developed by a consortium of different stakeholders—for the risk
assessment approach used to satisfy precaution and require the kill
switches suggested by resilience.74 Finally, the fourth strategy, liability,
could be used to deter anyone from deploying gene drives that do not
comply with the private standards that set the standard of care and
define best practices for courts to judge liability, especially when
government regulations do not exist.75

69. COMM. ON GENE DRIVE RSCH. IN NON-HUMAN ORGANISMS: RECOMMENDATIONS FOR
RESPONSIBLE CONDUCT, BD. ON LIFE SCIS., & DIV. ON EARTH & LIFE STUD., THE NAT’L ACADS.
SCIS., ENG’G, & MED., GENE DRIVES ON THE HORIZON: ADVANCING SCIENCE, NAVIGATING
UNCERTAINTY, AND ALIGNING RESEARCH WITH PUBLIC VALUES 14–17 (2016).
70. Id. at 26–39.
71. Gregory E. Kaebnick, Elizabeth Heitman, James P. Collins, Jason A. Delborne, Wayne
G. Landis, Keegan Sawyer, Lisa A. Taneyhill & David E. Winickoff, Precaution and Governance of
Emerging Technologies, 354 SCIENCE 710, 710 (2016).
72. Id. at 710–11.
73. See Michael R. Vella, Christian E. Gunning, Alun L. Lloyd & Fred Gould, Evaluating
Strategies for Reversing CRISPR-Cas9 Gene Drives, SCI. REPS., Sept. 8, 2017, at 2,
https://www.nature.com/articles/s41598-017-10633-2 [https://perma.cc/BHA7-QP95].
74. See Gary E. Marchant, ‘Soft Law’ Mechanisms for Nanotechnology: Liability and
Insurance Drivers, 17 J. RISK RSCH. 709, 710–11 (2014).
75. See id. at 715–17 (explaining that private standards can help determine standard of care
in litigation).
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This is just one example. But it is likely that most, if not all,
emerging technology governance needs can be best addressed by some
mix of the four governance strategies, whether it is two, three, or four
strategies working together in coordination. The choice of which
strategies to apply to a specific emerging technology problem, and the
way those strategies should interact together, will likely be a case-bycase determination, with no generic playbook that applies across
technologies and problems—at least initially. Over time and with
accumulating experience, successful patterns and structures for
integrating two or more governance approaches will likely emerge.
This need for ad hoc application of different strategies in a
synergistic manner creates the need for coordination. This need for
coordination among multiple actors is, again, a characteristic of
successful schemes that deal with wicked problems.76 This necessarily
fragmented response “therefore requir[es] coordination to increase
problem-solving capacity and effectively tackle wicked problems.”77
Since many of these strategies involve actors outside of government, it
is unlikely that government is the appropriate entity to provide this
coordination function.
Wendell Wallach and I have called for Governance Coordinating
Committees to do exactly this: coordinate the various actors and
strategies that need to be integrated to govern any given emerging
technology.78 More important than the specific coordinating mechanism
we propose, our analysis shows the general and well-recognized need
for some type of multistakeholder entity or forum for providing the
necessary coordination.79 There is a need for creation of such a
coordinating entity that does not itself implement the governance
strategies, but rather helps to communicate and synchronize various
governance initiatives, as well as to identify governance gaps that may
require additional action or initiatives. Of course, creation of such a
coordinating “orchestration” entity is not easy with many complex,
unresolved issues about funding, decisionmaking, participation, scope,

76. Tom Christensen, Ole Martin Lægreid & Per Lægreid, Administrative Coordination
Capacity; Does the Wickedness of Policy Areas Matter?, 38 POL’Y & SOC’Y 237, 237 (2019).
77. Catrien J.A.M Termeer, Art Dewulf & Robbert Biesbroek, A Critical Assessment of the
Wicked Problem Concept: Relevance and Usefulness for Policy Science and Practice, 38 POL’Y &
SOC’Y 167, 175 (2019).
78. Gary E. Marchant & Wendell Wallach, Coordinating Technology Governance, ISSUES SCI.
& TECH., Summer 2015, at 43, 43–50.
79. Gary E. Marchant & Wendell Wallach, Governing the Governance of Emerging
Technologies, in INNOVATIVE GOVERNANCE MODELS FOR EMERGING TECHNOLOGIES, supra note 5,
at 136, 142–47 (describing various attempts to create an “issue manager” to coordinate governance
of various emerging technologies).
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and authority.80 But here again, the wicked problem framing helps, as
wicked problems can only be managed by “messy institutions.”81
CONCLUSION
The governance of emerging technologies has been resistant to
effective solutions and strategies for some time. Traditional
government regulation will not work, at least by itself, due to the pacing
problem, the diversity of applications and stakeholders, and the
complexity created by unprecedented uncertainties and concerns that
go beyond safety and efficacy. Four alternative strategies have been
proposed or attempted: soft law, precaution, resilience, and liability.
Each of these approaches offers important benefits and advantages, but
each is also seriously flawed as the sole mechanism for governing
emerging technologies. Because the four approaches have been
perceived as competitors, in which only one can “win” and be
implemented, the debate over the governance of emerging technologies
has been one of controversy and conflict.
The wicked problem concept and literature provides a more
fruitful framing for addressing the governance of emerging
technologies. Wicked problems are characterized by uncertainty,
complexity, diversity, conflict, and controversy—just like the
governance of emerging technologies. The wicked problem framework
provides several useful insights that may be helpful for governing
emerging technologies. The first is the recognition that there will be no
optimal or perfect solution; thus, we must “muddle through” with
imperfect solutions. Second, the most effective approach for addressing
a wicked problem is to combine different strategies, which in the context
of emerging technologies means combining two or more of the four
governance strategies. Finally, a wicked problem needs some type of
coordinating mechanism, which has been a recognized need for
emerging technologies governance for some time. Combining these
three lessons from the wicked problem experience may provide a
more harmonized and effective integrated strategy for governing
emerging technologies.

80. Kenneth W. Abbott & Duncan Snidal, Strengthening International Regulation Through
Transnational New Governance: Overcoming the Orchestration Deficit, 42 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L. L.
501, 563 (2009).
81. Steven Ney & Marco Verweij, Messy Institutions for Wicked Problems: How to Generate
Clumsy Solutions?, 33 ENV’T & PLAN. C: GOV’T & POL’Y 1679, 1679–96 (2015).

